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In recent decades, Spain has been engaged in a process of massive and dramatic 
transformation, particularly with respect to democratization and decentralization of most 
of its public institutions, including education. The nature and scope of these efforts have 
been influenced largely by policy pressures emanating from supranational (European 
Union-EU) and global processes, as well as local, regional
1, and national state 
imperatives. This paper focuses specifically on one of Spain’s comunidades autónomas 
(autonomous communities), Catalonia, in order to examine these dynamic processes in 
the context of educational policy formation. Drawing on empirical resources, including 
data generated through semi-structured interviews with key educational actors
2 in 
Barcelona and Madrid, and document analysis of key policy documents collected in 
Barcelona, Madrid, and Brussels, this paper focuses on contemporary shifts in 
educational policy production concerning decentralization in Catalonia with respect to a 
range of multiscalar pressures. First, I broadly discuss the literature on globalization and 
educational governance and the need to extend beyond binary oppositional frameworks 
often used in literature on educational decentralization. Next, I provide a background on 
Spanish democratization and the various pressures surrounding the development of a 
mass educational system. The last two sections of the paper move from micro to macro 
                                                 
1 The term region is purposefully used to signify national regionalist communities within and across nation 
state territorial and political boundaries. Terms, such as sub-nation and “nations without states” 
(Guibernau, 1999), have similarly been used in the literature. In the case of Catalonia, I refer to it as both a 
nation without a state and to remain consistent with European and EU Studies literature, as a region.  
 
2 All direct quotes from participants and referred to as personal communications, followed by the date of 
the interview. In some cases, I have refrained from classifying the date of the interview to ensure 
confidentiality and anonymity. 
 perspectives to highlight the complex shifts in governance across regional, national, and 
EU political spheres.  
 
Globalization and Educational Governance 
In recent years, modern states have been increasingly influenced by a range of 
political and economic forces stemming from the agendas of intergovernmental and 
supranational organizations, and what states now perceive as the demands of new global 
economy. This has deep implications for educational policy production. Indeed, the role 
of the nation state in education appears to have shifted, as national education systems 
around the world face significant global and supranational pressures on the development 
and negotiation of educational policy, and seek to reconcile these with local and regional 
traditions and priorities. Scholars have focused on the nature and scope of these broader 
global processes, and their bearing on education (Burbules & Torres, 2000; Dale & 
Robertson, 2002; Morrow & Torres, 2003). This includes the development and impact of 
a European educational policy space (Nóvoa & Lawn, 2002).  
Often, studies of globalization and educational policy production primarily 
highlight the influence of global pressures “from above” in national education systems 
and the relationship between the global and the nation state (Brenner, 2004; Telò, 2002). 
This is also illustrated in studies of educational policy production in Europe, which have 
generally focused on the impact of European educational priorities on Member State 
education systems. However, as the state negotiates global and supranational pressures, 
new modes of educational governance are being produced, which place greater 
importance on local and regional scales in terms of the direction of policy development. In light of these developments, Catalonia is an interesting and instructive case of study 
given the numerous pressures that face the Catalan educational system. These pressures 
stem from simultaneous efforts in the post-Franco era of democratization, 
decentralization, globalization, and Europeanization with Spain’s 1986 accession into the 
European Community (EC). Consequently, educational policy, particularly in relation to 
educational decentralization, is being produced within a cross-section of multiscalar 
policy pressures.  
Notwithstanding the wide array of multiscalar pressures and embedded tensions in 
educational policy, models used to assess these issues have continued to hold up 
simplistic binary oppositions. These analyses generally followed a center-periphery or 
margin-center model of educational governance and policy production. These models’ 
underlying assumption is that the central government acts as a central power force over 
the less powerful peripheries, maintained from a distance. However, in the current era of 
globalization, these frameworks inappropriately assume that the periphery is at a distance 
from the power center, thus implying a level of passive disadvantage for the periphery. In 
applying these models to the case of Catalonia, the center-periphery framework 
essentializes the interrelatedness of political spheres into a linear, top-down model. This 
largely overlooks the tensions, contradictions, and consistent negotiations involved in the 
overlap of political scales, out of which public policy is produced.   
Both the center-periphery and nation state-global and nation state-EU constructs 
appear to remain focused on what Brenner (2004) has called “spatial fetishism” and 
“methodological nationalism.” This refers to the presupposition of the exclusivity and the 
static territorial, political, and economic stronghold of the nation state in policy production. In these frameworks, the nation state is conceived as a fixed container of 
social relations that has clear boundaries dividing the inside from the outside. In her 
recent work, Saskia Sassen (2006) noted that to study globalization and its implications, 
we have to “engage the most complex institutional architecture we have ever produced: 
the national state” (p. 1). However, Sassen (2006) went on to argue that much of the 
literature on globalization “leads to comparisons of the national and the global and easily 
falls into the trap of assuming that if the global exists it is in spite of the national” (p. 9). 
By bringing Catalonia to the center of analysis, I focus on the nature of global 
transformations by “moving inside the national state apparatus as it becomes the site of 
its own partial disassembling” (Sassen, 2006, p. 10). Ultimately, Catalonia provides an 
in-depth and rich perspective into the current status of the nation state transformations, 
and still maintains a focus on the nature of EU and global policy influences.  
In a foregrounding of Catalonia, center-periphery and nation state-global and 
nation state-EU frameworks appear to operate under suppositions about the state’s 
exclusive control over policy production, ultimately overlooking the dynamic overlap of 
local, regional, national, supranational, and global forces operating in policy production 
processes. Furthermore, there is mounting evidence that regions are becoming significant 
in EU politics as regions are finding the EU as a viable means of gaining political 
recognition and acting as key players in the project of European integration (Applegate, 
1999; Giordano & Roller, 2002; Roller, 2004; Wright, 2000). As Catalonia endorses the 
EU as a means for greater autonomy and recognition outside the Spanish state, the EU 
has emphasized decentralization and the utilization of its local levels, cities, and regions 
for greater European integration and the pursuit of greater economic growth.  Against this backdrop, it appears that global processes have sparked the 
reconfiguration of the state in educational policy formation, and reconstituted the 
relations between regions, nation states, and supranational entities. Consequently, the 
production of educational policy is occurring within “a form of ‘territorial complexity’ 
defined by the interaction of four levels of government (EU, national, regional or local)” 
(Closa & Heywood, 2004, p. 86). This paper attempts to better understand how the 
resulting political complexity of such changes impact Catalan educational policies and 
policy priorities. These complex processes of policy production at local, regional, 
national, EU, and global scales must not be overlooked, but rather examined more 
critically. 
  
Spanish Democratization 
Over the past thirty years, Spain’s democratization efforts have vastly changed the 
structure of the Spanish state and brought about a modern mass education system. These 
efforts come at the end of a 40-year Fascist dictatorship, lasting from 1939 to 1975, with 
the death of General Francisco Franco. Spain’s transition into one of the EU’s core 
democracies is often cited as a successful, miracle model, most recently for Central and 
Eastern EU countries once behind the Iron Curtain of communism. The adoption of the 
Constitución Española (Spanish Constitution) into law in 1978 is regarded as a 
cornerstone of Spain’s democratization efforts and the legal embracing of a democratic 
organization and set of civic values.  
Throughout the process of democratization, Spain has undergone vast and 
dramatic processes of transformation and reinvention, including the recognition of 17 autonomous communities (CCAA). The Constitution recognized the various national 
communities, particularly Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia, while also 
simultaneously labeling Spain as a “sole collective entity to have full sovereignty” 
(Núñez Seixas, 2005, p. 122). Catalonia has the status of one of the historical nations in 
the establishment of the State of Autonomies in Spain. It is located in the northeastern 
region (just slightly larger than Belgium) of the Iberian Peninsula, bordering the 
Mediterranean Sea, France, Andorra, Aragon, and Valencia. Catalonia is made up of four 
provinces: Barcelona (its capital), Gerona, Leida, and Tarragona. According to the 
Catalan Institute of Statistics, Catalonia has the second largest population out of the 17 
CCAA in Spain (the largest is Andalusia), with over 7 million inhabitants reported in a 
2006 census. The population of Catalonia makes up 16% of the total population of Spain. 
While discussed in detail in this section, it is noteworthy that Catalan cultural and 
linguistic identity is not limited to the territory of Catalonia described here. Balcells 
(2006) pointed out 
Catalan identity is not confined to Catalonia proper since the Catalan language is 
spoken in a much larger area inhabited by a total of 11 million people and 
comprising Catalonia itself, the Kingdom of Valencia, the Balearic Islands, the 
Principality of Andorra, and the Catalan regions which were annexed to France in 
1659. (p. 1) 
 
As early as the 9
th century, Catalonia emerged as an independent entity, with self-
governing political institutions and laws (Guibernau, 1999). 
While a detailed historical overview of Catalonia and the relationship between 
Spain and Catalonia and their political institutions is well beyond the scope of this paper, 
it is significant to note that widespread oppression in the name of unity has been well 
ingrained in Spanish history. As early as the 15
th century, Castilian hegemonic forces began to repress communities along what became known as the peripheries of Spain, in 
which the Castilian language and Spanish nationalism become one in the same. 
Throughout the 18
th and 19
th centuries, Spain used the promotion of a national language 
as means to link citizens together and to enhance political participation. There were 
periods of political, cultural, and linguistic resurgence and cultural revival. However, 
these were typically followed by repressive periods of centralization. This is the case at 
the dawn of the 20
th century, in which Spain, like a pendulum, swung back towards strict, 
centralized rule.  
In the early 20
th century, an authoritarian political organization was developed, 
called the Falange, which was linked to the dictatorship led by Primo de Rivera in the 
1930s. During the Civil War, the Falange sided with the Nationalists and became a 
leading force under Franco. During this period, an overwhelming suppressive agenda 
towards cultural and linguistic minorities was invoked, as Franco’s social and political 
vision underpinned the “fortif[ication of] the ‘New Spanish State’” (Hanson, 2000, p. 13). 
The development of a Francoist state had a profound impact on the Spanish educational 
system, and recent educational reforms over the past three decades  
Construction of the Francoist state 
At the end of the 1930s, with the Civil War victory of Franco and the nationals, 
backed by the old aristocracy, upper class, and the Catholic Church, the Francoist regime 
was established. The central values underpinning the Francoist political project included 
nationalist rhetoric, little political and cultural freedom, the creation of a strong central 
state concentrated on the political and military power of one man, “el generalísmo,” the 
declaration of the state as officially Catholic, with the Catholic Church having a great deal of cultural and educational control, a lack of political mobility among citizens, and 
intellectual and cultural poverty as a result of censure and the exile of many intellectuals 
(Muñoz & Marcos, 2005, p. 151).  
The strong Franoist central state did not necessarily extend into the construction 
of a public education system. Rather, the public education system became marked by the 
sheer absence of the state. A clear example is the percentage of Gross National Product 
(GNP) expended on public education, which in 1975 was 1.78%, as compared to 5.1% 
European average (this included the USSR) and 4% African average in 1975 (Hanson, 
1989a, p. 41). During the 40-year Francoist dictatorship, the Spanish education system 
“was characterized by the Church’s monopoly…a rigid institutional structure, and by an 
extreme uniformity and centralization” (Esturla, 2000, p. 322). In fact, one of the first 
actions taken by the Francoist regime was the handing of educational control over to the 
Catholic Church, in terms of organization, regulation, and funding. 
As typical under authoritarian rule, the Francoist regime was preoccupied with 
stability. This is reflected in the highly centralized Spanish educational system. For the 
masses, education was seen as a vehicle for promoting nationalist rhetoric and Catholic 
values, as demonstrated in the public school use of a “cultural transmission model based 
on ideological control rather than instrumental knowledge” (Bonal, 2000, p. 203). In 
general, textbooks focused on three main areas: Catholicism, Spanish nationalism, and 
Franco as el caudillo (the maximum leader) (Hanson, 1989a). Franco himself was 
glorified throughout society and in schools. Historic images and “supreme symbols of 
national unity” also were invoked to illicit a national sense of lo español (that which is 
Spanish), such as historical references to Catholicism from the Roman period, the Reconquista, referring to the Christian conquering of the Iberian Peninsula from the 
Moors and the exile of the Jews, and the Spanish Catholic Monarchs (Muñoz & Marcos, 
2005, p. 176; my translation). In addition to textbooks and the promotion of symbolic 
images, it is reported that over 60,000 teachers between 1936 and 1945 were forcibly 
reassigned, suspended, or fired, replaced by a member of the Falange (Hanson, 1989b, 
2000).  
During the years of the Francoist dictatorship, an overwhelming suppressive 
agenda towards cultural and linguistic minorities was invoked. For Franco and the 
nationalist movement, expressions of regional nationalism were synonymous with the 
undermining of the project of Spanish unity and thus, subject to reprimand. Following the 
Civil War, Franco’s position towards Catalonia was one of hostility and resentment. 
Hughes (1993) wrote that “Barcelona ha[d] been the last bastion of resistance to Franco, 
and the dictator never forgave the city for it” (p. 8). Franco also resented Barcelona 
because of its open port, which had potential of giving way to “the influence of 
foreigners, to strange and nonnative ways…[and] offering an ease of entry and exit that a 
landlocked capital does not” (Hughes, 1993, p. 8-9). In the post-Civil War developments, 
the diverse communities of Spain were largely treated as occupied territories after the 
Civil War. 
As a result, the language of Catalonia was silenced and condemned on the street, 
in print, in schools, in politics, and in communication. Balcells (1996) wrote that the 
Francoist dictatorship  
was confident that by excluding the Catalan language from the radio, the daily 
press, the cinema, the schools and, later, from television, it would succeed in 
cutting off the great majority of the population from the difficult rebirth of 
Catalan national awareness. (p. 144)  
Catalan names used on ships and boats had to be translated to Castilian, beginning in 
1945, and Catalan names were banned from civil registries. One account described 
Franco’s declaration of Catalan, the language of Catalonia, as nothing more than “la 
lengua de perros,” (“the tongue of dogs”), as Franco encouraged Barcelona police to 
reprimand the use of Catalan, in which Catalan-speakers were ordered “Habla Cristiano!” 
“Speak Christian!” invoking once again a Castilian identity synonymous with 
Christianity (Grant, 1988, p. 157). This suppressive agenda continued even as Spain 
opened its borders and experienced economic growth in the latter half of the Francoist 
dictatorship.  
Democratization: Pressures and Policy Pursuits 
Spain’s transition to a social democratic state after the death of Franco and the 
democratization of institutions inherited from the Francoist era were widely influenced 
by Spain’s engagement with both European and global pressures. First, Spain’s dramatic 
transformation is largely due to the opening up of the Spanish market in the early 1960s 
to international competition. While the first half of the Francoist years can be 
characterized as highly centralized, the latter half is known for the state’s massive 
economic growth due to industrialization and the development of its tourist industry. The 
opening of the market was also paired with the embracing of “a new political discourse 
based on ‘democracy’ and modernization” on the part of Spanish citizens (Bonal, 2000, 
p. 203). Notwithstanding the shift towards market liberalization and civil society’s 
embrace of democratic values, the Francoist regime continued it executions, with the last 
assassination taking place just two months before Franco’s death in September of 1975. In light of the political, economic, social, and cultural changes during the second 
half of the Francoist era, there were shifts towards greater expansion of educational 
access, out of which a modern mass education system in Spain was born. The first major 
educational act since 1857 was developed under the Francoist regime in 1970. The 
Education Reform Act (LGE) of 1970 emphasized equality of educational opportunity 
and the benefits of a meritocracy (Bonal, 2000). One major mandate of the law was 
obligatory school attendance for all citizens under the age of 14. This brought about 
significant increases in educational enrollment patterns in Spain, which the state was not 
equipped to deal with financially or structurally.   
While the transition to democracy was eased given the societal embrace of 
discourses of democratization, the reform of Spanish public institutions, including 
education, posed a formidable challenge. As Torres and Piña (2004) pointed out,  
in the 1970s, in comparison with other OECD countries, Spain had a small and 
unbalanced public sector, with important deficiencies in infrastructures and 
limited activities in the fields of the redistribution of wealth, welfare, health, 
education, social and cultural services. (p. 447) 
 
Spain’s difficulty in reforming the educational sector to meet the demands of increased 
enrollments and provide equal educational opportunities was similar to the challenges 
many Western countries encountered given the economic crises of the mid-1970s. 
Guillén and Álvarez (2001) argued that the 1970s oil crises halted Spanish economic 
growth and made implementation of social policies and an overhaul of public institutions 
inherited from the Francoist era difficult, given the lack of state funding. In the late 
1970s, Spain’s dependence on oil, which was steadily rising in cost, brought about a 
number of political and economic challenges. In 1977, the inflation of Spain was 24.5 
percent, and unemployment grew from “6 per cent of the active population in 1977 to 17 per cent in 1981” (Heywood, 1995, p. 95). This posed many issues for the reform of the 
public sector and the consolidation of democracy in Spain.  
After winning the 1982 national election, the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party’s 
(PSOE) efforts included a program aimed to reinforce administrative efficiency across 
the state (Heywood, 1995). It also resulted in a shift in policy from “attention to equity in 
social policy…in favour [sic] of a search for efficiency” (Guillén & Álvarez, 2001, p. 
115). This shift is in part a consequence of the Spanish state looking to the European 
Commission (EC) and OECD countries as models for economic growth, social stability, 
and public policy. During this period of transition, “Becoming Europeans” was an 
expression used in Spanish political rhetoric as it “implied economic growth, and an 
improvement of social policy along the lines of the social democratic, Scandinavian 
systems” (Guillén & Álvarez, 2001, p. 113). Europe was an idealized model of 
modernization in Spain, which included efforts to align the Spanish education system 
with European standards of education. Ultimately, Spain’s 1986 accession into the EC 
allowed for Spain to engage directly in vigorous pursuit of policies aligned with 
European interests and provided Spain with a strong boost economically in order to 
reform public policy and build the public infrastructure necessary for a democratized 
Spain (Gillespie, 2000). 
Substituting for the earlier 1980 law, the 1985 Regulatory Organic Law of the 
Right to Education (Ley Orgánica del Derecho a la Educación-LODE) was passed, 
which decentralized educational responsibility, signifying a different role of the state with 
respect to educational governance, and brought about important structural developments 
(Edge, 2000). As the LODE emphasized the importance of decentralization to democratization, there was recognition of the need for “a system of participation where 
all sectors of society have the right to decide about issues of organization, pedagogy, and 
educational finance” (Hanson, 2000, p. 46). It was this legislation (and that of the early 
1990s) that established a multilevel system of educational governance “with the creation 
of school councils in which parents were represented, and trends towards stronger 
management and steering at school level” (Pereyra, 2002, p. 668). Multiple agencies and 
councils at various local and regional levels were established to create a decentralized 
system. 
As a result, parents, teachers, unions, students, and local level communities could 
be represented in the educational system. Edge (2000) discussed the development of the 
State School Council (Consejo Escolar del Estado-CEE), as an 80 member national 
advisory body representing teachers, parents, unions, administrators, and scholars. The 
main responsibilities of the State School Council have been to submit proposals for 
educational change. The Conference of Education Counselors also was established, 
which brought together the Ministry of Education and Science (MEC), the Chief 
Education Officers (CEOs) of all CCAA systems, the Consejos Escolares del Centro 
(Education Council), and Consejos Escolares (Local School Councils).  
Following the 1985 reform were two policy documents: Proyecto para la 
Reforma de la Enseñanza (debated in 1987 and completed in 1988) and El Libro Blanco 
para la Reforma del Sistema Educativo (1989). These two reports detailed the underlying 
debates of educational reform during this period, indicating particular educational actors, 
central questions, problems, and necessary changes to make in order to improve the 
Spanish educational system. These reports formed the backbone of the 1990 Organic Law on the General Organization of the Educational System (LOGSE). In essence, the main 
aspects of reform included basic education as compulsory and free, extended to the age of 
16, the expansion of vocational education to all students, reduction of educational 
inequity, and mandated improvements in the quality of teaching (Fierro, 1994). 
New mandates also included a focus on excellence in all institutions of education, 
equality of educational opportunities, and “an explicit objective to not lose ground in the 
process of European convergence” (Bonal, 1998, p. 156, my translation). One example is 
the importance of vocational education, primarily through the pursuit of Leonardo da 
Vinci grants, which are part of a EU program aimed to aid in the development of lifelong 
learning through vocational training.  The PSOE also enacted the Organic Law on 
Participation, Assessment and Governance of Institutions of Education (Ley Orgánica de 
Participación, Evaluación y Gobierno de los Centros Educativos-LOPEG). This 1995 
law aimed to regulate the evaluation of educational institutions. As part of the move 
towards excellence and quality assurance, there were also developments in educational 
investigation, inspection, and evaluation (MEC, 1999).  
In the 20 years since the death of Franco, educational enrollments rapidly grew. 
Hanson (2000) noted that the number of public schools increased from 1,100 in 1975 to 
approximately 3,000 in 1995, and compared with the 44% of school attendance of 15 
year olds in 1975, approximately 100% of 15 year olds were enrolled in 1995. Along 
with the rising enrollment rates, in the 1990s, efficiency was emphasized, as evident in 
the implementation of a NPM doctrine, which was rigorously introduced in order to 
advance the Spanish system of public administration (Torres & Piña, 2004). In 1996, the 
right-wing Popular Party took on the reformation of the public sector with neoliberal ideologies of privatization, market liberalization, and an increase in quality and 
efficiency, leading to a decrease in attention given to equality and social inclusion. After 
proposing its initial legislation without majority support, the PP was able to enact the 
Organic Law on Quality in Education (Ley Orgánica de Calidad de la Educación-LOCE) 
(MEC, 2002).  
  With implementation of the 2002 law just barely off the ground (implementation 
began in 2003), new leadership of the Socialist Party in Spain in 2004 introduced a series 
of policy reforms. Under the new direction of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, President of 
the Socialist Party, a new educational bill was proposed. The bill was heavily publicized 
with debates mainly over the teaching of religion. In May 2006, the new educational 
legislation was passed, entitled the Organic Law of Education (Ley Orgánica de 
Educación-LOE). The Preamble of the LOE states that due to Spain’s accession into the 
EU, and participation in projects and conferences with other nation states organized by 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and other 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), Spain must now focus on improving upon the 
quality and effectiveness of its educational system. López (2006) argued that the LOE 
establishes these three principles: quality education for all, shared effort, and integration 
in Europe. The third principle is described in the Preamble as the goal to adequately 
prepare Spanish students for the demands of the knowledge economy and open its 
education system up to the world, including a focus on multilingualism, mobility, and 
cooperation with Europe. This includes a plan for using European benchmarks to 
determine Spanish educational progress in comparison with other EU member states in the following areas: the reduction of number of early school exit, the increase in rates of 
graduation, and improvement of basic skills in reading, mathematical, and scientific 
literary performance, as measured by Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) data.  
In the several decades of dynamic political shifts and rapid policy production, it is 
noteworthy that processes of democratization in Spain have not been free of conflict. 
Whereas the Constitution was fashioned as a guiding model for the consolidation of 
democratic values and the achievement of a decentralized, yet unified nation state system 
in politics and public policy-making, there have been many uncertainties. As the mass 
modern educational system has developed in Spain, it has been shaped by the form of 
decentralization undertaken in Catalonia and Spain. The following section examines the 
nature of asymmetrical decentralization, utilizing reflections and interpretations of key 
educational system actors in Barcelona and Madrid. 
 
Asymmetrical Decentralization 
In the transition from the Francoist dictatorship to democracy, decentralization 
was one strategy that the Spanish state employed to meet the increasing pressures of the 
historical nations (Catalonia and the Basque Country), and as means to consolidate 
democratization. The Constitution of 1978 restructured the preexisting 50 provinces into 
a State of Autonomies, which established the 17 CCAA and two autonomous cities, 
Melilla and Ceuta. Closa and Heywood (2004) defined the democratic State of 
Autonomies as 
a hybrid that attempts to meet three different (and to some extent contradictory) 
demands: first, the continued unity of the Spanish nation, inherited from its history as a strongly centralized state. Second, the recognition of the right to self-
government of those regions with a strong sense of national identity….Third, the 
option for decentralization for other regions which aspired to autonomous self-
government. (p. 84) 
 
The division between regions with a strong national identity and regions with aspirations 
for self-government was defined early in the transition process as a way to guide 
decentralization. In the process of decentralization, the CCAA were classified as either 
the  
nacionalidades (the Basques, th[e] Catalans and the Galicians), which can claim 
the status of ‘historical nations’, and regiones [the regions], which strive for 
autonomy on the basis of particular historical prerogatives (Navarre), their 
geography (the Balearics, the Canaries), or for socio-economic reasons 
(Andalusia, Extremadura, Valencia). (Börzel, 2002, p. 95)  
 
With respect to the transfer of educational competencies to CCAA, it is worth noting that 
the decentralization process in Spain was not a blanket process, applied at the same time 
to all 17 of the CCAA.  
In the transition period, in the uneven development of decentralization, the 
establishment of the model of the Spanish state and powers allotted to the CCAA was not 
a smooth course of action. In fact, this process involved a contentious number of debates. 
Heywood (1995) argued, “it is…unsurprising that regionalism should have proved the 
single most contentious political issue during the post-Franco construction of democracy; 
nearly one-tenth of the lengthy Constitution is devoted to regional matters” (p. 142-143). 
It was decided that the three historical nations did not have to “make any formal 
application to the central state,” as they were granted privileged status based on their 
respective Statutes of Autonomy established during the Second Republic (Heywood, 
1995, p. 143). The other CCAA were divided into a grade one, the fast track, and grade 
two, the slow track. Table 1 provides an illustration of the three stages of educational governance and the legal transfer of educational competencies from the central state to 
the CCAA. 
Table 1 
Process of educational decentralization 
 
 
Stage        Category                 CCAA 
    
   First (1979-1980)       “Historical nations”                   Catalonia and the Basque   
                                                                                                    Country     
 
   Second (1981-1992)      Grade One “Fast Track”      Andalusia, Canary  
                       Islands, Valencia, Galicia,  
                                                                                                    Navarre 
 
   Third (1992-2000)       Grade Two “Slow Track”      Aragón, Asturias, Balearic  
                       Islands, Cantabria,  
                                                                                                    Castilla-La Mancha,   
   Castilla y León,                                                 
    Extremadura, La Rioja,  
    Madrid, Murcia 
 
Conflict and debate surrounded the process of decentralization, particularly as special 
circumstances were allowed for several of the CCAA. In the Spanish Constitution, 
Article 151 outlined an alternative route, in which any CCAA may “apply to receive the 
same high level of autonomy as the privileged regions, provided that a stringent series of 
conditions was first satisfied and the draft autonomy statute was subsequently endorsed in 
a referendum” (Heywood, 1995, p. 144). As described by Heywood (1995), after 
Catalonia’s and the Basque Country’s Statutes of Autonomy were approved by the 
central state in 1979, “there was an outbreak of so-called ‘fiebre autonómica’ (autonomy 
fever) as all the remaining regions sought to establish regional governments,” justified by 
Article 151 of the Constitution (p. 144; author’s italics). Rather than follow the grade one 
and two process, Navarre, based on its particular history, was granted a “special route,” while two CCAA (the Canary Islands, Valencia) were granted a status in between grades 
one and two (Heywood, 1995, p. 144). Furthermore, in the asymmetrical process of 
decentralization, all CCAA chose the option of full political autonomy over 
administrative autonomy, which created both competition and tension among the CCAA.  
Café Para Todos?Coffee For Everyone?
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On the millennium, the final decision-making authorities were transferred to the 
remaining CCAA, constituting Spain as one of the most politically and educationally 
decentralized states in Europe (Hanson, 2000). Pereyra (2002) wrote that “in theory, 
these reorganisations [sic] seek to maintain a balance between unity and diversity through 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration” (p. 668). As such, there were hopes of 
intergovernmental cooperation between the CCAA. With all CCAA opting for full 
political autonomy, the state moved to equalize levels of autonomy across all CCAA. 
This invoked widespread conflicts among the CCAA over claims that particular CCAA 
were receiving greater privileges through the decentralization process, including taxation 
privileges. Börzel (2002) argued that the Spanish central state’s attempts to equalize all 
levels of autonomy across the state 
further reduced the privileged status that the three nacionalidades had initially 
enjoyed. The policy of ‘café para todos’ (coffee for everyone) as opposed to 
‘champagne for the nacionalidades’…profoundly challenged the preferential 
status and caused substantial conflicts between the nacionalidades and the central 
state. (p. 95) 
 
This also caused both competition and resentment between the CCAA.   
Those on the slower track of decentralization resented the privileges seemingly 
provided to the historical nations (Börzel, 2002). Even among the historical nations, there 
was a lack of intergovernmental cooperation. Börzel (2002) reported that Catalonia 
                                                 
3 Börzel. T. (2002), p. 95 regularly complained that the “Basques and the Navarese are ‘given brandy with their 
coffee’” in the form of taxation privileges” (p. 95). These tensions escalated during the 
decentralization process of Spanish public institutions, as they required fiscal 
restructuring to support and equalize the transition of authorities to the CCAA.  
The financial inequality across the 17 CCAA also became a central issue in the 
decentralization process. In the new funding system, the CCAA were each allotted grants 
from the central government to provide funding for public administrative costs of 
education, health, and transportation. The block grant funding system, along with the 
Inter-Territorial Compensation Funds (FCI), which sought to decrease the economic 
inequity between wealthy and more impoverished regions, helped to increase the public 
expenditure on education to over 5% of Spain’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 1996 
(Edge, 2000). This is a dramatic increase from the 2.6% expenditure on education in 
1981 (Hanson, 2000; Torres & Piña, 2004). The FCI “was initially distributed according 
to a formula based upon relative levels of income, migration, and unemployment rates” 
(Heywood, 1995, p. 152-153). However, issues of migration from other parts of Spain to 
Catalonia caused a reevaluation of the FCI structure. Wealthier CCAA, such as 
Catalonia, have also resented the FCI given their higher contributions, and what they 
have been provided in return.  
In attempts to gain greater regional competencies, the CCAA have not been able 
come together to form a cooperative relationship that would allow them greater collective 
bargaining power with the central Spanish state. When asked about the level of 
cooperation that exists between the CCAA, one educational leader in Barcelona 
responded “Inexistent. Inexistent….The state intervenes a lot because whatever collaborative agreement made between the CCAA, there has to be approval from the 
Parliament” (personal communication, May 29, 2006). In order for the CCAA to begin to 
form more cooperative relationships with one another, they need the support of the 
central state. In this way, the central state maintains an authoritative position, which 
limits the intergovernmental cooperation between the CCAA. Consequently, the conflict, 
competition, and the independent “cada una por su cuenta” (to each their own) policies of 
the CCAA has limited their mobilization for greater autonomy from the central state 
(Börzel, 2002, p. 102).  
Shaping the Decentralization Process 
A political form of decentralization was a central mode of governance advocated 
in Spain to meet the regional demands of Catalonia and the Basque Country for greater 
autonomy, decision-making, and the revival of historical rights. Political decentralization 
also was perceived as a vehicle for greater democratization and local empowerment. At a 
crucial stage in the shift from a strict authoritarian dictatorship to a democratic 
organization, a political form of decentralization was deemed necessary for the 
consolidation of the democratic Spanish state. An educational leader stated, “giving more 
competencies to the autonomies has been important in order to get the administration 
closer to the citizenry. The closer to the citizen, the better” (personal communication, 
June 19, 2006). In this way, a political form of decentralization was assumed to be a core 
ingredient to the successful continuation of the process of democratization. With the 
adoption of the Spanish Constitution into law, it was widely considered by politicians, 
citizens, and scholars to be the backbone of Spain’s efforts of democratization.  The Spanish Constitution outlines the division of competencies between the 
CCAA and the central state. In the current decentralized Spanish state structure, the 
division of power between the central government and the CCAA can be divided into 
three levels, those exclusive the state, those exclusive to the CCAA, and those that are 
shared between the state and the CCAA. In the drafting of the Spanish Constitution, 
Articles 148 and 149 illustrate the jurisdiction and the division of competencies between 
the CCAA and the state. Article 148 states that CCAA may take on responsibility over 
self-government, territorial planning and housing, environmental protection, and the 
promotion of economic development within the national economic framework, museums 
and libraries of interest to the CCAA, monuments, and the promotion of culture, research, 
and teaching of the regional language. Article 149 section 1 and section 1a state that the 
state has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of basic conditions that guarantee 
equality of all Spanish citizens to exercise their constitutional rights.   
Article 149 sections 2a-3a states that the central state also has exclusive 
competency over nationality, immigration, international relations, national defense and 
the Armed Forces, general planning of economic policy, the protection of Spain’s cultural 
and artistic heritage, museums, libraries and archives of the state, regulation of conditions 
relative to obtaining, issuing and standardization of academic degrees, and statistics for 
state purposes. The final section of Article 149 states that competencies not expressively 
attributed to the state by the Constitution will correspond to the CCAA, in line with their 
respective Statutes of Autonomy. Competencies that are not assumed by the Statutes of 
Autonomy will correspond to the state. The most complex issues of governance fall into the area of shared competencies 
between the state and CCAA. Education is interpreted to lie within this area, in which the 
Ministry of Education and Science (MEC) shares educational responsibilities with the 
CCAA. According to the MEC,  
the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Statutes of Autonomy ensure that the 
common elements of educational policy and the Spanish educational system will 
be directed by the MEC, and cooperatively managed by the MEC and the 
respective Ministries of Education in each of the CCAA that already have had 
educational competencies transferred to them. 
(http://www.mec.es/educa/jsp/plantilla.jsp?area=ccaa&id=31, para. 1; my 
translation) 
 
Due to the complexity of shared educational competencies, and the ambiguity of the 
Constitution, there has been an overall challenge of whether Spain “would have one 
educational system made up of 17 integrated, semi-autonomous parts rather than 17 
separate educational systems” (Hanson, 2000, p. 20). In response to this challenge and 
regional pressures for greater educational autonomy, the MEC established a system, in 
which educational responsibilities over policy production would be divided across three 
levels: central state, CCAA, and local administration.  
The Spanish state’s structures of administration include the MEC, the Alta 
Inspección in each CCAA, and the provincial offices in Melilla and Ceuta. The powers 
allotted to the central administration include the regulation of the entire state system in 
order to standardize and unify the Spanish education system, international and European 
cooperation in the area of education, evaluation and inspection through the authority of 
the Alta Inspección, the regulation of teacher and other professional qualifications, and 
the establishment of minimum educational requirements for each center of education. The 
MEC specifically controls basic educational legislation, accreditation of certificates and degrees, general planning of the education system, and the determination and 
maintenance of minimum requirements for common curriculum areas, especially those of 
national concern, such as Spanish history, Spanish national language, mathematics, and 
science.  
The implementation of educational policies dictated by the central state and the 
remainder of educational responsibilities, such as the design of academic programs to 
support cultural, linguistic, and economic development of regional communities, is 
reserved for the CCAA. Additionally, a system of shared curricular control between the 
central state and CCAA has been established in the post-Franco era. This system of 
shared control is regulated through a system of “minimum academic requirements” or 
“minimums.” The system of minimums mandates that 65% of the curriculum of 
secondary schools (55% in CCAA with another language, such as in Catalonia) must 
reflect a national (Castilian) focus, and the remaining 35% is left up to the individual 
CCAA. It is noteworthy that not all of the CCAA have adopted a decentralized 
educational program. Pereyra (2002) noted, “some autonomous regions have adopted 
central programmes [sic], so that instead of having a single centralist state, there are now 
several centralist autonomous governments” (p. 668). This provides for extensive 
complexity in the asymmetrical form of educational decentralization currently undertaken 
in Spain. 
Drawing on the above discussion, the development of the Spanish educational 
system is characterized by state legislation in the form of a new or reconstituted organic 
law, which the CCAA are then charged with implementing. In the Constitution, Article 
27 section 1 states that “everyone has the right to education,” and Article 27 section 2 states that “the objective of education shall aim at the full development of the human 
personality in respect for the democratic principles of coexistence and the basic rights 
and liberties” (http://www.constitucion.es/constitucion/lenguas/ingles.html#1, Section 27, 
para. 1-2). As described by an educational authority in Barcelona, “the Constitution states 
that the central government guarantees basic, fundamental rights to its citizens through 
organic laws, which affect the entire state” (personal communication, June 7, 2006). 
While the curriculum is divided into a system of minimums, with Catalonia able to utilize 
55% of the total curriculum, Catalonia cannot generate its own law of education 
independent from Spain. In other words, as one educational policy-maker in Barcelona 
stated, “The organic laws always affect all of Spain. The organic law has to be applied, so 
when the law is approved, the Autonomous Communities have to apply it” (personal 
communication). Without actual legislative control to produce policy independent from 
the central Spanish state, Catalonia’s power stems from essentially how it implements the 
central law. As one educational expert in Catalonia indicated, “ the Autonomous 
Communities have very little margin to innovate in education” (personal communication) 
This follows the work of Balcells (1996), who argued that the state  
has succeeded…in gradually undermining the jurisdiction of the self-governing 
communities through the widespread use of the leyes de bases whose function is 
not to establish general guidelines for the self-governing communities, but to 
define matters reserved to the State on account of their importance, the precise 
degree of importance being determined by the central government itself. (p. 192) 
 
As the Spanish state has undergone dramatic reterritorialization under strategies of 
political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization, the state has used strategies to 
exercise its power and authority.  The other issue with the CCAA’s implementation of the organic laws is the rapid 
changes made in educational legislation with each new political stage of the post-Franco 
era. With six laws passed in little more than three decades, the CCAA have been 
consumed by constant educational changes to implement: “what has happened is that 
ultimately the educational laws change so often that right when we are implementing the 
organic law, there is already a revision to the law” (personal communication). Even 
among the rapid changes, participants argued that Catalonia has not gained any additional 
autonomy legislatively to produce policy.  
 
Educational Decentralization in Catalonia 
At the level of the CCAA are the Ministries and Departments of Education that 
represent the CCAA. These government structures are charged with overseeing the 
portion of the curriculum allocated to the regional level of the CCAA, the creation of 
centers, and staff administration. In each of the CCAA, there is a local administration that 
is usually represented by municipal structures, which control aspects of education such as 
ensuring compliance with obligatory education and the maintenance of infant and 
primary education. Given that the CCAA interpret and administer policies dictated by the 
central state, the form of educational decentralization appears to represent a functional 
model of decentralization. As an educational authority in Catalonia explained during an 
interview  
The Constitutional Tribunal interpreted education as a shared competency, in 
which the state dictates mandates through the organic law, which includes all of 
the basic norms, such as the right to education. Then, the CCAA are charged with 
implementation of these mandates. That is to say that educational policy 
development functions constitutionally as something shared without actually being shared, but it is the interpretation that they have given it. (personal 
communication, June 6, 2006) 
 
In this case, the central state creates national legislation dictated by Article 148, Section 
1, and the CCAA are then charged with implementing these norms. Here, the participant 
is arguing that while the Constitutional Tribunal has interpreted education as shared, 
legislative control remains under the authority of the central state. 
The MEC claims to control only aspects over basic educational legislation in 
order to guarantee the basic rights to education. However, there are many cases in which 
regional CCAA policy-makers and system actors have interpreted state educational 
policy production as an extension of central state control into the terrain of CCAA 
competencies. For example, a high level authority in Catalonia explained that 
It can no longer be claimed that these [central state policies] are just the basic 
norms because they have completely invaded the terrain of the Autonomous 
competencies. In other words, if it [the central state] ends up regulating things like 
the size of letters in textbooks, the number of pages that the textbooks should 
have…it is clear that they are regulating aspects that are not basic principles, that 
are not rights, but rather they are regulating aspects of education that are 
competencies of the CCAA. (personal communication, June 6, 2006) 
 
Even the ways in which policies are implemented in CCAA are regulated by the state. An 
educational leader in Catalonia concisely stated, “the state does the determining,” 
(personal communication, July 11, 2006). Furthermore, in the decentralized Spanish 
state, the CCAA pay capital tax and collect income tax, while the central state exercises 
authority over educational policy production. As one educational expert in Catalonia 
explained, “the State legislates, the Autonomous Communities pay” (personal 
communication, May 29, 2006). Even with increased fiscal responsibilities at CCAA 
levels, the central Spanish state maintains an important role in policy production, which 
has particular implications for CCAA decision-making.  In a discussion of fiscal decentralization, one educational leader in Catalonia 
described the state as yielding particular decision-making powers to Catalonia because of 
its responsibility financially. The educational leader in Catalonia argued,  
Because we have to pay, we need to have something to say. The important things, 
we cannot decide, and if there are leftovers, we can eat the leftovers. We pay for 
the cake, and sometimes we get to decide what to do with the leftovers. (personal 
communication, June 1, 2006) 
 
The CCAA are increasingly responsible for fiscal matters, although they remain steered 
by the state in matters of policy decision-making and standard-setting. 
  This appears to be interpreted as the case, even in efforts to increase Catalonia’s 
participation in a number of intergovernmental arenas. The Sectoral Conferences 
(Conferencias Sectoriales) is a mechanism that the state has adopted for encouraging 
greater participation from Catalonia in policy-making decisions. The Sectoral 
Conferences emerged out as a way in which officials of the central state could cooperate 
and coordinate with CCAA leaders “in order to maximize intergovernmental cooperation 
and to avoid conflicts” (Moreno, 2002, p. 405). One participant argued that during the 
process of decentralization 
one of the problems that [policymakers and government officials] detected in the 
1980s was that there were no institutions of dialogue between the CCAA and the 
central state…the Sectoral Conferences were established to exist as a type of 
intergovernmental conferences. (personal communication, May 29, 2006) 
 
Each Sectoral Conference consists of the Minister of Education and representatives from 
each of the 17 CCAA. The Sectoral Conference functions as a way in which to encourage 
the exchange of information, increase intergovernmental participation, propose 
educational policies that guarantee the basic equality of citizens, determine collaborative 
projects, examine performance indicators, and exchange and compile data from each of the CCAA in order to construct a profile of how the state of Spain is proceeding in 
meeting EU educational criteria.  
While Catalonia is represented in the Sectoral Conferences, one participant 
argued that the scope and agenda of the Sectoral Conference itself is under authority of 
the central government. The participant stated, “You must realize that the Sectoral 
Conferences are controlled by the central government because it is the central 
government that has the capacity to establish the agenda” (personal communication, May 
29, 2006). In the Spanish state’s attempts to establish intergovernmental relationships 
with the CCAA, it seems to rely primarily on vertical relations, with the power extending 
down from the central state to the CCAA. These vertical relations have been interpreted 
by system actors at the level of Catalonia to be unidirectional emanating from the state to 
the CCAA. An educational expert in Catalonia reflected on this issue, 
I think that the CCAA have much less trust for the state than the state does of the 
CCAA for one basic reason. The state, through legislation, can have much more 
of an effect on the CCAA....The state has many means to intervene in the 
CCAA... If they [the state] have everything already done and made, such as the 
law of education, what are we going to say? You can see the lack of trust much 
more from the CCAA towards the central government basically for this reason. 
(personal communication, May 29, 2006)  
 
Given Spain’s history, the relationship between Catalonia and the central state from the 
perspective of system actors in Catalonia seems to reflect a level of mistrust towards the 
central state. Extending this discussion is the reconfiguration of regional, nation state and 
EU governance structures in recent processes of educational policy formation, 
particularly those concerning decentralization.  
 
 Overlap of National and Regional Politics in the EU 
Across the history of the development of the EU, regions have played a key role. 
As early as the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the Preamble stated that the original six members 
needed “to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious 
development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the 
backwardness of the less favoured [sic] regions” (European Commission, 2000, p. 5). In 
1975, there were attempts to develop the poorest regions of Europe, which included the 
establishment of the European Regional Development Fund, which aimed to reallocate 
the budget contributions of Member State countries.  
As the EU continuously developed through the 1990s, regions were provided even 
more developmental support. With the Maastricht Treaty, cohesion became designated 
“as one of the main objectives of the Union, alongside economic and monetary union and 
the single market” (European Commission, 2000, p. 5). Additionally, Jones and Keating 
(1995) argued that the 1980s enlargement to include southern states that possessed 
regional diversity, and the reorganization undertaken in a number of Member States 
resulted in a greater need to take the role of regions into account during the 1990s. 
Moreover, the authors showed that in the early 1990s “spending by the Community on 
regional policy had increased to around a quarter of its budget” (p. v). With the 
Maastricht Treaty, the EU’s policy-making institutions changed, and regions developed 
particular decision-making capacities. As the EU focused on the economic development 
of the various regions in Europe, and cohesion became a significant policy objective, 
literature on the EU began to emphasize analyses of the regions.  In the 1980s, scholarly work on the EU offered little analysis on the role of 
regions within the EU. However, as multilevel governance became a useful framework 
for political scientists and scholars in the social sciences in the 1990s, regions were 
provided increased attention. In this literature, there was a growing focus on the EU as an 
institution that has given rise to regions within their respective nation states (Closa & 
Heywood, 2004). Debates over the EU’s regional policy have been rooted in diverse 
contexts, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain, the German Länder, and the 
Flemish in Belgium. In each of these diverse contexts, advocates of greater regional 
representation in the EU have argued that above all, regions in the EU lead to greater 
citizen participation in EU decision-making and thus, greater democratization. In the 
EU’s development, regional policy has been emphasized as means for greater economic 
development and cooperation towards particular goals among all EU countries and 
citizens. In the 2000 European Commission document, Working for the Regions, it was 
stated, “Europe’s regional policy is above all a policy of solidarity….Regional policy is 
also a policy for people” (p. 3). The argument also follows that with an emphasis on the 
cultural diversity of EU regions, there is greater economic integration in the EU.  
It is helpful to distinguish two forms of regionalism, following the work of 
Keating (1995). Regionalism, Keating (1995) argued, can take many forms, two of which 
are top-down regionalism and bottom-up regionalism. Keating (1995) explained that top-
down regionalism takes “the form of national regional policies,” whereas bottom-up 
regionalism is “in the form of regional political and economic mobilization” (p. 2). The 
first, Keating (1995) discussed, related to many nation states in Europe and their policies 
towards regional development. Keating (1995) wrote Economically, these [regional policies] were justified in terms of the need to tap 
under-utilized resources in peripheral and declining regions and increase national 
output. Politically, they served to enhance national solidarity and secure support 
from peripheral regions for the State regime or the party in power. (p. 2) 
 
Many regions also possess long histories of independent cultural and linguistic traditions.  
Keating (1995) discussed that at the same time as nation states in Europe 
emphasized regional development policies for economic and political purposes, many 
regions reasserted their “historical claims for regional and national distinctiveness” (p. 3). 
In the politics of European integration, the EU increasingly has become a forum, in which 
regions have the potential to gain greater autonomy from the central state. As Wright 
(2000) stated, “there is evidence that regions have found the umbrella of the EU as 
encouragement to bid for autonomy” (p. 179). The EU has also had an impact on the 
reshuffling of relationships and partnerships between regions, nation states, and the EU, 
in that new political alliances and networks are developing across regions, nations, and 
supranational levels. 
With the 1988 structural funds reform establishing a partnership principle 
between regions, nation states, and the EU, regions have increasingly gained 
representation in the context of the central state, as well as the EU. Giordano and Roller 
(2002) noted, “in recent years, regional entities as well as nationalist political parties have 
increasingly been able to further their demands within the international arena and to 
attract support for their causes both at home and abroad” (p. 101). This has raised 
questions regarding a Europe of the Regions (Applegate, 1999), or as MacLeod (1999) 
stated, Euro-supranationalism. Moreover, the institutional development of the Committee 
of the Regions (COR) and the principle of subsidiarity brings about an increase in 
regional authority and empowerment, which I have discussed elsewhere (Engel, in press).  In the draft of the EU Constitution, regions are mentioned in Title 1, under 
relations between the EU and Member States. Article I-5.1 stated that the EU respects 
each of the Member States, “inclusive of regional and local self-government.” The EU 
also has discussed regions in the Constitution in the context of safeguarding diversity. 
Article I-3.3 stated that the EU “shall respect rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and 
shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.” These views 
have emphasized decentralization as a means of local and regional representation, means 
for greater EU integration, and the enhancement of economic development. Yet, in order 
for the European integration project to be successful, the EU actively seeks mechanisms 
to get as close to the citizen as possible. In this way, the EU draws on regional and local 
authorities for its own purposes, in much of the same way that regions like Catalonia look 
towards the EU. Consequently, the relations between regions and nation states have 
become reconfigured by the EU, and are no longer neatly funneled into center-periphery 
and nation-EU frameworks. The following discussion looks at the case of Catalonia, 
Spain, and the EU more specifically. 
 
EU and Catalonia: Cooperation, Contestation, and Mediation 
  The EU has historically existed as a common model of modernization for both the 
Spanish state and Catalonia. Giordano and Roller (2002) wrote, “’Europe provided a 
unifying objective” (p. 104). This is shown recently in the context of education. For 
example, as the EU has pressed forward with the Bologna Process, a move to harmonize 
the higher education systems of EU countries, the reaction from Catalonia and more 
broadly, from Spain, is in opposition. One participant argued, “Spaniards are opposed to Bologna, all of the rest of Europe supports it, it is an extraordinary thing. But the 
Spaniards remain…against Bologna” (personal communication). The EU’s educational 
programs, such as Bologna have been interpreted in such a way that aligns European 
integration with a particular neoliberal interpretation of globalization, and what is 
believed to be a global agenda to privatize education.  
Cooperation 
When I visited the Autonomous University of Barcelona during the summer of 
2005, as typical throughout Spain and Catalonia, there was politically oriented graffiti 
that covered walls and signs on campus. I visited the campus during several protests held 
during the process of implementing reforms of the Bologna Treaty. In the middle of the 
university campus, was a message in Castilian Spanish painted across the concrete steps: 
“No Bologna, We are not a Market. Universities are not Markets.” One participant 
described this sentiment among Catalan students and community members: “It is very 
funny actually because the Catalan nationalists prefer to side with Spaniards that are 
opposed to Bologna. They talk about privatization” (personal communication). The 
participant went on to interpret the movement of opposition to the EU’s educational 
agenda as a unifying issue for all citizens of Spain, so much so that the Catalan 
movement for greater autonomy and self-government is overshadowed in the process. 
The EU also has been a factor of intergovernmental support between the CCAA. 
In interviews with two policy makers in Barcelona, they described responsibilities of 
regional offices in Brussels to include the translation of documents and information. The 
offices then communicate this information to their respective regional government 
departments in promotion of regional interests. These regions also support the COR and regularly participate in regional meetings in Brussels. One significant issue that emerged 
during interviews with regional policy makers involved the change in the 
intergovernmental relationship between the CCAA in the context of the EU. One 
participant described the relations between CCAA to be “non-existent” in the context of 
Spain, but “very cooperative” within Brussels (personal communication). The CCAA 
often cooperate and communicate about projects and discussions in Brussels that affect 
regional interests, while in Spain, they often do not or are unable to cooperate. 
Contestation 
However, the EU has also served as a major point of conflict between the central 
Spanish state and the CCAA, particularly Catalonia and the Basque Country. The ideal of 
the EU as a new domain in which historical regional demands can resurface has been 
promoted in Catalonia, even if this ideal of the EU has remained vague. Keating (1995) 
argued that in Catalonia, “Europe is evoked more vaguely, as providing an arena in which 
the regional personality can be projected and as an alternative frame of reference to the 
State” (p. 8). The role that the EU plays in relations between Spain and Catalonia remains 
ambiguous. In the post-Franco era, while Catalonia has increased powers of governance 
and shared responsibilities with the central government, as stated in the previous chapter, 
the Spanish Constitution remains ambiguous regarding the participation of the CCAA in 
international or EU affairs (Closa & Heywood, 2004). Drawing on the example of 
constitutional ambiguity in Spain and the EU, there have been many conflicts over the 
role of the CCAA in foreign policy. One example involves the establishment of CCAA 
offices in Brussels.  In 1986, with Spain’s accession into the EC, the Basque Country and Catalonia 
immediately established regional offices in Brussels. The central Spanish state questioned 
the legality of regional representation in Brussels, and argued that it undermined Spanish 
national unity in foreign matters (Closa & Heywood, 2004). The case was brought to the 
Constitutional Tribunal, which ruled in 1995 that CCAA could in fact participate in 
foreign affairs under the condition that they not act against Spain’s foreign policy (Closa 
& Heywood, 2004). Since 1995, all of the Spanish CCAA have had regional offices in 
Brussels. Even with the regional offices in the EU, the central state has not allowed 
Catalonia and the other CCAA to freely participate in international affairs. For example, 
any visit that the Catalan president makes abroad has to be communicated with the 
central state (personal communication). Generally, it is considered that foreign policy is 
the jurisdiction of the Spanish central state. One central government official explained 
the [CCAA] can have their own external relations…it’s like defense. Defense is 
the jurisdiction of the central state, but each CCAA can have their own 
autonomous police, like [Catalonia’s] Mosso d’Esquadra, but they have to work 
in coordination with the state police and security forces. With foreign policy, 
Catalonia has to work in line with the central state. (personal communication, July 
6, 2006) 
 
Foreign policy has been a source of conflict for the central state and Catalonia. A 
participant reflected: “the central state is not very keen on the international role of the 
[CCAA] but it has to accept it because the Constitutional Tribunal has accepted 
[regional] offices in Brussels” (personal communication, July 6, 2006). Still, the central 
policy maker in Madrid went on to state that any of the CCAA “can open offices around 
the world, teach their regional languages to whomever all they want, but they can still not 
bypass the competencies of the state” (personal communication, July 6, 2006). In this way, the central Spanish state’s foreign policy is utilized to exercise a significant amount 
of authority over Catalonia and the other CCAA. 
With these examples, the debate continues over the extent to which regions can 
even participate in the EU. Roller (2004) wrote that “greater representation and 
participation in the EU’s institutions have become an increasingly salient issue in 
Catalonia, particularly in light of the Spanish government’s more marked refusal to agree 
to anything other than indirect participation” (p. 82). During an interview with an 
educational official in Barcelona on May 29, 2006, the participant discussed the debates 
regarding central Spanish state educational offices in Brussels and whether or not they 
should be decentralized to Catalonia and the other CCAA. This is a central issue, the 
participant explained, because some of the educational policies that are being developed 
at the Catalan level for the interests of Catalonia depend directly on Brussels, and do not 
depend on the central state. However, while there is a major push to decentralize the 
control of European offices in Brussels to regional levels of the CCAA, the authority to 
decentralize still remains in the hands of the central state. This control, one participant 
stated, “is something that they [the central government] will never give us” (personal 
communication, June 19, 2006). It was also the general view among participants that until 
Catalonia has its own foreign policy and can act independently in the context of the EU, 
it will remain a nation seeking statehood. 
Mediation 
Additionally, the EU has been looked at as a mediating force to help solve 
conflicts evoked in a decentralized model of the Spanish state. In the case of the CCAA 
of Spain, the EU is emphasized as an institution, which can serve to solve conflicts between CCAA and the central state. Pereyra’s (2002) study of decentralization and 
centralization in Spain looked specifically at two CCAA: Andalusia and the Canary 
Islands. These two regions have been ranked as two of the poorest CCAA in Spain and 
least developed regions in the EU. The study examines the tensions that have arisen in the 
transition of the Spanish state.  
Pereyra (2002) reported that all participants viewed the central government as 
possessing a lack of sufficient knowledge and capacity for the management of the 
decentralized education system, especially as some of the CCAA, such as Catalonia, 
continue to pursue policies to gain increased autonomy. With regards to the EU, Pereyra 
(2002) wrote that participants in the study “make references to alternative power bases 
beyond the central state-for example the [EU]” (p. 672). The participants also believed 
that the EU is not advocating strongly enough for “consensus among countries in 
educational matters” (Pereyra, 2002, p. 672). The reactions from system actors from 
Andalusia and the Canary Islands suggest that the EU is viewed as a mediating force for 
internal state affairs, as well as the intergovernmental conflicts arising among the CCAA. 
In this sense, the EU has been interpreted as an institution above the state that is able to 
help establish national unity in the face of what is perceived to be fragmentation brought 
on by a decentralized structure.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter maps out contemporary processes of educational policy production 
across Catalonia, Spain, and the EU. Throughout this paper, I have illustrated some of the 
key educational policy debates in relation to Catalonia’s engagement with supranational and global pressures, as well as pressures emanating from local, subnational, and national 
imperatives. It is my central argument that these reflections disrupted the traditional view 
of a singular state structure in global-nation frameworks or center-periphery notions of 
educational decentralization. Moreover, models such as center-periphery, which is often 
used in describing state spaces and their governance constructs, tend to ignore the 
complexity in the overlap of political spheres. At the root of these models is a state-
centrism that continues to permeate through the social sciences. However, drawing on the 
case of multiscalar pressures reshaping one of Spain’s historical nations (Catalonia), it is 
evident that “what is emerging is a complex political order in which European politics is 
becoming more regionalized; regional politics is increasingly Europeanized; and national 
politics is both Europeanized and regionalized” (Giordano and Roller, 2002, p. 100). In 
rejection of the center-periphery and global-nation frameworks, this chapter discusses 
policy production through the complex overlap of conflicting interests, aims, imperatives, 
and pressures. 
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